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I. Defining Family Responsibilities Discrimination
When people think of sex discrimination, they tend to think of
glass-ceiling discrimination and sexual harassment. Recently, however,
there has been an explosion of potential liability in a rapidly ex-
panding area of employment discrimination law: family responsibili-
ties discrimination ("FRD"). FRD is employment discrimination
against people based on their caregiving responsibilities-whether for
children, elderly parents, or ill partners. FRD includes both "maternal
wall" discrimination-the equivalent of the glass ceiling for mothers-
and discrimination against men who participate in childcare or pro-
vide care for other family members. When an employer treats an em-
ployee with caregiving responsibilities based on stereotypes about how
the employee will or should behave, rather than on that employee's
individual interests or performance, it has engaged in FRD. Examples
of FRD include removing a new mother from an important project
based on the assumption that she will be less committed to work now
that she is a mother or demoting a male employee simply because he
asks for time off to care for his ailing, elderly parent.
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As of 2005, the Center for WorkLife Law at the University of Cali-
fornia Hastings College of the Law had documented over six hundred
cases of FRD.1 There has been a nearly four-hundred percent increase
in these types of cases in the last ten years, as compared with the prior
decade. 2 Research suggests that a considerably higher win-rate may
exist in these cases as compared to other civil rights cases.3 By 2005,
there were sixty-seven cases with verdicts and settlements exceeding
$100,000, 4 with the largest verdict in an individual case reaching
$11.65 million. 5
This boom in litigation provides lessons for plaintiffs' attorneys,
employers, and management-side attorneys alike-all of whom the
Center for WorkLife Law (the "Center") works with to prevent unlaw-
ful discrimination based on family responsibilities. To assist plaintiffs,
the Center runs an attorney network to ensure that people with FRD
claims receive high-quality representation and a hotline for mothers
and others who believe they have experienced discrimination at work
based on their family responsibilities. At the same time, the Center
works with employers and management-side employment attorneys to
identify unexamined biases about employees who provide family care
and to develop trainings and policies to correct those biases.
Attorneys bringing FRD claims face a threshold conceptual issue:
How should plaintiffs frame FRD cases under existing discrimination
law when neither "mother" nor "parent" is a protected classification?
Initially, some plaintiffs' lawyers were confused about how to litigate
these cases successfully. For example, quite a few suits were filed
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 6 ("PDA"), alleging discrimi-
nation against new mothers.7 The PDA prohibits discrimination based
1. MARY C. STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DiscRIM-
INATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 6 (Center for WorkLife Law, Uni-
versity of California, Hastings College of the Law ed. 2006), available at http://
www.uchastings.edu/site-files/WLL/FRDreport.pdf. To date, the Center has identified
over eight hundred FRD cases.
2. Id. at 7.
3. See id. at 13 (fifty percent success rate as opposed to twenty percent success rate).
4. Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Family Responsibilities Discrimination:
What Plaintiffs'Attorneys, Management Attorneys and Employees Need to Know, 91 WOMEN LAw. J.
24, 25 (2006).
5. Schultz v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., No. OIC-07-02, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9517, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2002); see Matt O'Connor, Ex-Hospital Worker Awarded
Millions, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2002, at 1.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
7. See, e.g., Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that a claim of discrimination based on the plaintiffs status as a new parent is not
cognizable under the PDA); Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440,
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on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions and re-
quires that pregnant women be treated the same as other temporarily-
disabled employees.8 It does not, however, provide protections for
new mothers.
Substantial law review literature argues that the best way to help
mothers facing the maternal wall is to insist on accommodations in
the workplace. 9 This, too, is a flawed approach. A maternal-wall case
framed in terms of a mother's need for accommodation at work will
fail because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 10 ("Title VII") does not
require employers to accommodate mothers' special needs. 1 More-
over, in cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act 12
("ADA"), courts assume accommodation will be expensive for employ-
ers, so they are reluctant to insist that employers provide
accommodations. 13
FRD cases need not be shoehorned into protections for preg-
nancy nor require individual accommodations to be litigable. FRD
cases can be litigated as straightforward gender discrimination cases
under Title VII or under a variety of existing laws, as explained in Part
IV. Workplace norms continue to be defined as they were generations
ago-designed around men's bodies and life patterns. From the em-
ployer's perspective, the ideal worker is someone who works full-time,
year-round for years on end, without career interruptions, and with no
443-45 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a claim for time off from work to nurture and parent
newborn child, rather than to deal with a physical disability relating to pregnancy or child-
birth, was not cognizable under the PDA); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, 960 F. Supp. 1487,
1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that leave for child-rearing is not protected by the PDA);
Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 442-45 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that leave
to provide medical care for newborn twins is not covered by the PDA); Record v. Mill Neck
Manor Lutheran Sch. for the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding child-
rearing leave not protected by PDA).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
9. See, e.g., Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 305 (2004); Laura T. Kessler, The Attach-
ment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Eco-
nomic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REvom 371 (2001); Peggie R. Smith,
Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 569 (2002).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
11. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that, under
Title VII, no valid comparison could be drawn "between people, male and female, suffer-
ing extended incapacity from illness or injury" who need accommodations and "young
mothers wishing to nurse little babies" who request similar treatment).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
13. Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 62 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 39-40, 67 (2005).
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domestic or childcare responsibilities. Today, women comprise forty-
six percent of the American workforce. 4 Only women can bear chil-
dren, and, in fact, eighty-two percent of American women become
mothers during their working lives. 15 Still, American women perform
eighty percent of child-care duties. 16 If employers design good jobs
around men's bodies and life patterns-despite the fact that nearly
half the workforce is women-that is sex discrimination. Changing
this norm is not asking for special treatment; it is eliminating
discrimination.
Ironically, maintaining an ideal-worker norm designed around
traditional notions of male life patterns results in gender discrimina-
tion against men, too. Expecting full-time, uninterrupted work from
men assumes that they have a free-flow of domestic support (i.e., a
housewife), which has the effect of policing men into an outdated,
stereotypical gender role. When men break from this expectation and
are penalized at work-for example, retaliated against for taking a
family and medical leave-they too experience unlawful gender
discrimination.
When employers design desirable jobs around traditional mascu-
line work patterns, gender stereotypes arise in everyday interactions.
H. Putting Stereotyping Evidence to New Use
The growing trend of family responsibilities cases has also created
a new role for stereotyping evidence in employment discrimination
lawsuits. As employment attorneys know, the traditional way to prove
disparate treatment under Tide VII is to use a comparator to show
that the plaintiff was treated worse than another similarly situated em-
ployee who was not a member of the plaintiffs protected class. Yet two
recent FRD decisions have opened the door to enable a plaintiff to
bring a disparate treatment cause of action without having to point to
a comparator, but rather proving the case with stereotyping evidence
instead.
14. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 2005,
http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qf-laborforce-05.htn (on file with authors).
15. BARBARA DowNs, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2002 (U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-548.pdf (stating that, in
2002, 17.9% of women aged forty to forty-four had never had children).
16. JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS
AMERICANS USE THEIR TIME 104 (2d ed., 1999) (1997).
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The first case, Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School Dis-
trict,1 7 is a stunning decision in which the Second Circuit held that an
alternative way to prove disparate treatment under Title VII, in the
absence of a comparator, was through evidence of gender stereotyp-
ing. 18 In Back, the plaintiff was a school psychologist whose supervisors
told her "that this was perhaps not the job or the school district for
her if she had 'little ones,' and that it was 'not possible for [her] to be
a good mother and have this job."1 9 Her employer denied her tenure
based on the assumption that, because she had kids, she would not
continue to work hard after she got tenure.20 The plaintiff ultimately
lost at trial, but the holding remains: even without a comparator, a
plaintiff can prove disparate treatment on the basis of stereotyping.
The second case, Lust v. Sealy, Inc.,21 is another breakthrough
case in which the Seventh Circuit (in an opinion by notably conserva-
tive Judge Richard Posner) allowed attribution bias to serve as evi-
dence of gender stereotyping. 22 As discussed later in this Article,23
attribution bias is a form of "subtle" cognitive bias, in which gender
stereotypical behavior is attributed to an individual despite the indi-
vidual's nonconformity with that stereotype. In Lust, the plaintiff was
an ambitious, successful salesperson whose supervisor denied her a
promotion to a management position based on her supervisor's as-
sumption that, because she had children, she would not want to
move-despite the fact that she had never told him that and had, in
fact, repeatedly expressed her desire to be promoted.24
Note that while the 1989 landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 25 which established the use of stereotyping evidence as evidence
of gender discrimination, relied on expert testimony to make this con-
nection,26 recent FRD cases have not. Fifteen years of stereotyping evi-
dence has given even the layperson the power to understand that an
employer who makes decisions about individual female employees
based on stereotypes about women's behavior is engaging in gender
discrimination.
17. 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).
18. Id. at 119-121.
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id.
21. 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004).
22. Id. at 583.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. Id.
25. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
26. Id. at 255-56.
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Why have these breakthroughs in the use of stereotyping evi-
dence come in FRD cases? For two reasons: first, discrimination
against mothers is not always subtle; often it is as blatant as discrimina-
tion against women was in the 1970s. In 2006, no reasonable employer
would tell a woman that she will never be promoted because she is a
woman. Yet, as many FRD cases show, employers often make such
blanket, discriminatory statements about mothers-for example, that
a female employee was "'no longer dependable since she had deliv-
ered a child"' and that her "'place was at home with her child."'
27
The second reason for the success in FRD cases is that they are
"family values" cases that appeal to judges across the political spec-
trum, from liberal to conservative, Calibresi to Posner. While many
people were shocked at Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist's decision
in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs28 that the Family
Medical Leave Act 29 ("FMLA") was intended to remedy gender dis-
crimination and thus applied to state governments, 30 he may well have
been motivated in part by his own family experience: Rehnquist had a
daughter who was a mother, and he had to leave the court several
times to pick up his grandchildren when his daughter had childcare
difficulties. 3' Whether liberal or conservative, the powerful men who
sit as judges in FRD cases often have daughters or spouses who have
experienced maternal-wall discrimination. Penalizing women at work
for being mothers or for doing what any responsible parent would do
runs counter to valuing families.
III. Unlawful Gender Stereotyping Patterns in FRD Cases
In light of courts' recent recognition of stereotyping evidence to
support gender discrimination in FRD cases, it is important to identify
and recognize the common patterns of such stereotyping. Much of
this material comes from a groundbreaking 2004 volume of the Jour-
nal of Social Issues,32 which described maternal-wall stereotyping and
27. Bailey v. Scott-Gallagher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997) (quoting what the
company's vice-president had told the female employee).
28. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
30. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 725.
31. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the
FMLA? The Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
PoL'Y 193, 208 (2004).
32. The Maternal Wall: Research and Policy Perspectives on Discrimination Against Mothers,
60J. Soc. ISSUEs 667, 667-865 (2004) (multiple authors contributed to this issue, edited by
Monica Biernat, Faye J. Crosby, and Joan C. Williams).
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established, for the first time, that motherhood is one of the key trig-
gers for gender discrimination.
The most basic form of gender stereotyping in maternal-wall
cases, as discussed earlier, is that good jobs in the United States are
often defined around masculine life patterns, requiring an immunity
from household work that most mothers lack. Ninety-five percent of
mothers aged twenty-five to forty-four with school-aged children at
home work less than fifty hours per week, year round.33 This means
that all an employer has to do is define its "full-time" jobs as requiring
fifty or more hours per week, and the employer has come close to
wiping all mothers-and, therefore, nearly seventy-eight percent of
women 3 4-out of its labor pool.
A related type of maternal-wall stereotyping is role incongruity-
the "[d]o you want to have babies, or do you want a career here?"
question actually asked of Kathleen Hallberg while employed at Aris-
tech Chemical Corporation. 35 This type of stereotyping, marked by
the idea that a woman cannot be both a good mother and a good
employee, is common in the FRD cases the Center has studied.
Hallberg, a female engineer, brought suit against Aristech after she
was passed over for promotions following the birth of her son.3 6 Ajury
awarded her $3 million 3 7 which a judge later overturned.38
Other patterns include: (1) benevolent prescriptive stereotyping,
(2) attribution bias, (3) leniency bias, and (4) negative competence
assumptions. Benevolent prescriptive stereotyping is when an em-
ployer acts in a seemingly helpful way based on what it believes a
mother "should" do. For example, in the case of Trezza v. Hartford,
Inc.,39 an outstanding lawyer was not offered a promotion based on
her employer's assumption that she would not want to travel because
33. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey: 2006 March Supplement, available at
http://dataferrett.census.gov/TheDataWeb/index.html (using the DataFerrett, files gen-
erated Apr. 25, 2006). Data generated by Mary C. Still for the Center for Worklife Law.
34. If eighty-two percent of women become mothers during their working lives (see
supra note 15 and accompanying text), and ninety-five percent of that eighty-two percent
work less than fifty hours per week (id.), then nearly seventy-eight percent of women work
less than fifty hours per week.
35. Ann Belser, Mommy Track Wins: $3 Million Awarded to Mom Denied Promotion, Purrs-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 1999, at B.
36. Id.
37. Telephone Interview with Joel Sansone, Attorney for Plaintiff Kathleen Hallberg
(Nov. 25, 2002) (on file with authors).
38. Id.
39. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998).
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she was a mother.40 Trezza's employer never asked her about travel
before making the assumption and denying her the promotion. 41 The
district court denied her employer's motion to dismiss her claim of
discriminatory failure to promote.42
In attribution bias, stereotypical behavior is attributed to a
mother, regardless of whether she conforms to the stereotype. For ex-
ample, an absent male worker is assumed to be out of the office for a
work-related reason, such as a business meeting, whereas an absent
female worker is assumed to be out of the office for a reason related
to her children. The Center has actual lawyer interviews documenting
attribution bias at work. For example, one female lawyer stated that
after she reduced her hours, she no longer received positive perform-
ance reviews because of gender stereotyping. 43 The lawyer also gave
details of stereotypical behavior incorrectly attributed to her by her
employer and co-workers. 4 4
Another pattern is leniency bias, in which the employer applies
an objective rule rigorously to the "out" group but leniently to the "in"
group-for example, denying light duty to pregnant women while al-
lowing it liberally to men with back injuries. 45 A 2005 Cornell Univer-
sity study showed that mothers are held to longer hours and higher
performance and punctuality standards than non-mothers. 46 Con-
versely, fathers are held to lower hours and lower performance and
punctuality standards.47
A final maternal-wall pattern is negative competence assump-
tions, in which women are suddenly presumed to be incompetent
when they become mothers. The 2005 Cornell study showed that, rela-
tive to other kinds of applicants, mothers were rated as less compe-
tent, less committed, and less suitable for higher promotion and
40. Id. at *3.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *1.
43. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 97 (2003).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Deneen v. Nw. Airlines Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1998) (alleging
that a seventy-five pound lifting requirement was not uniformly enforced); Lehmuller v.
Vill. of Sag Harbor, 944 F. Supp. 1087, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying the defendant
police department's motion for summary judgment after the police department had de-
nied a pregnant officer light duty because pregnancy was not an off-the-job injury, despite
granting light duty to other officers injured off-the-job).
46. ShelleyJ. Correll & Stephen Benard, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Pen-
alty? Conference Proceedings: Am. Sociological Ass'n Annual Meeting 23 (June 13, 2005)
(on file with authors).
47. id.
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management training and deserving of lower salaries. 48 Another set of
studies showed that while respondents rated businesswomen as very
high in competency, similar to businessmen, they rated housewives
alongside the most stigmatized groups, to use the language of the
study: the elderly, blind, "retarded," and disabled. 49 This is exempli-
fied by a Boston attorney who said, "[S]ince I came back from mater-
nity leave, I get the work of a paralegal .... I wanted to say, 'look, I
had a baby, not a lobotomy!"' 50 The lawyer left her job a "business-
woman" and came back a "housewife."
Unfortunately, one characteristic of maternal-wall stereotyping is
that it can show up as stereotyping of women by women. One example
is Walsh v. National Computer Systems, Inc.,51 a hostile work environment
harassment case in which a female employee-the mother of a child
with repeated ear infections that required many visits to the pediatri-
cian-was harassed by her female supervisor.5 2 Interestingly, the su-
pervisor was not only a woman, but was also a mother who had a child
with similar health problems who lost some of his hearing as a result.5 3
In treating the employee she supervised so hostilely, perhaps the su-
pervisor felt she had something to prove. Given the pressures women
are under to avoid reinforcing negative stereotypes of working
mothers, these cases are very complicated psychologically.
Conflicts also arise between mothers and the roughly eighteen
percent of women without children.54 They arise whether the women
are childless, i.e., they "forgot" to or could not have children, or child-
free, i.e., they did not want to have children. Of course, childless wo-
men did not "forget" to have children; they just found that having
children was incompatible with their ideal-worker career paths. In the
resulting conflict between mothers and childless women, the latter
may feel it unfair for some women to "have it all" when they could not.
Child-free women are in a different situation. As cultural entrepre-
neurs, they are trying to invent a new image of a full adult female life
48. Id. at 23.
49. Thomas Eckes, Paternalistic and Envious Gender Prejudice: Testing Predictions from the
Stereotype Content Model, 47 SEx ROLES 99, 108-10 (2002); Susan T. Fiske, et al., A Model of
(Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status
and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITy & Soc. PSYCHOL. 878, 885-888 (2002).
50. Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 585, 588 (1996).
51. 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 1154-55; Jim Kaster, Attorney for Plaintiff Shireen Walsh, Oral Comments
at the American University of Washington College of the Law, Washington, D.C.: The New
Glass Ceiling Conference (Uan. 24, 2003).
53. Kaster, supra note 52.
54. DOWNS, supra note 15.
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without children and may fear that working mothers reinforce nega-
tive stereotypes about all women and work.
In short, the maternal wall often pits women against women. That
the harasser or discriminator is a woman is often used to argue against
the existence of gender discrimination. However, that gender stereo-
types pit women against women is evidence of gender discrimina-
tion-not proof that it does not exist.
Courts have begun to recognize that maternal-wall stereotyping is
common. The most stunning example is Rehnquist's opinion in Hibbs,
which adopts language seemingly right out of the plaintiffs brief:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by paral-
lel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for
men .... These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-
fulfilling cycle of discrimination .... [T] he faultline between work
and family [is] precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has
been and remains strongest .... 55
Likewise, in Back, the court expressed the opinion that
[i]t takes no special training to discern stereotyping in the view
that a woman cannot "be a good mother" and have a job that re-
quires long hours, or in the statement that a mother who received
tenure "would not show the same level of commitment [she] had
shown because [she] had little ones at home."5 6
Here, the court signals that expert testimony is unnecessary to
identify stereotyping, an important development for plaintiffs, given
the significant expense of expert testimony.
State courts are also recognizing maternal-wall stereotyping.
Sivieri v. Commonwealth57 demonstrated this, a Massachusetts case in
which a state employee who was the mother of a small child sued for
sex discrimination after being passed over for three promotions given
to less qualified coworkers who did not have young children. 58 "Taken
as true," the court found "these allegations establish a bias against wo-
men with young children predicated on the stereotypical belief that
women are incapable of doing an effective job while at the same time
caring for their young children."59 These cases demonstrate that
courts at all levels-whether the United States Supreme Court, circuit
courts, or state courts-are beginning to accept stereotyping evidence
in family responsibilities discrimination cases.
55. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736, 738 (2003).
56. Back v. Hastings, 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004).
57. Sivieri v. Commonwealth, No. CA02-2233H, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 201, at *1
(June 25, 2003).
58. Id. at *3-4.
59. Id. at *8.
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Finally, it is important to recognize that the maternal wall also
affects men. If there is a chilly climate for mothers in the workplace,
there is a frigid climate for fathers. A study of over five-hundred em-
ployees found that compared to mothers, fathers who took a parental
leave were recommended for fewer rewards and were viewed as less
committed. 60 Fathers who had even a short work absence due to a
family conflict were recommended for fewer rewards and had lower
performance ratings. 61 Not surprisingly, the desire to avoid this type
of bias in the workplace likely plays a key role in men's decisions not
to request leaves or flexible work schedules. 62
Both men and women experience FRD and gender discrimina-
tion when they are policed into stereotypical gender roles. An ex-
treme example is the hostile prescriptive stereotyping experienced by
the plaintiff in Knussman v. Maryland,63 in which the manager of the
medical leave and benefit section of the agency told a male police
officer that his wife must be "'in a coma or dead,' for [him] to qualify
as the primary care giver." 64 The bottom line for fathers seems to be
that if they perform caregiving occasionally, they are princes, but if
they perform more than a little caregiving, they are "wimps."
IV. Legal Theories in FRD Cases
The Center's research has shown that employees are increasingly
likely to sue their employers over family responsibilities discrimina-
tion.65 In addition, the Center has identified seventeen different legal
theories that plaintiffs have used successfully in FRD cases, under Title
VII, the FMLA, the Employment Pay Act 66 ("EPA"), the Americans
with Disabilities Act6 7 ("ADA"), the Employee Retirement Income Se-
60. Christine E. Dickson, The Impact of Family Supportive Policies and Practices on
Perceived Family Discrimination (2003) (unpublished dissertation, California School of
Organizational Studies, Alliant International University) (on file with authors).
61. Id.
62. Carol L. Colbeck & Robert Drago, Accept, Avoid, Resist: Faculty Members' Responses to
Bias Against Caregiving... and How Departments Can Help, CHANGE (Nov./Dec. 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/change/sub.asp?key=98&subkey=829 (last vis-
ited Aug. 20, 2006).
63. 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
64. Id. at 630.
65. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
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curity Act68 ("ERISA"), and various statutory and common law
theories. 69
Many of these cases are straightforward disparate treatment or
gender discrimination cases under Title VII. As discussed earlier,
some FRD cases have direct evidence of blatant gender bias through
the "loose lips" of supervisors or employers who made discriminatory
statements about mothers. Disparate treatment cases can involve ad-
verse employment actions such as the refusal to hire. For example,
one firefighter's interview consisted of questions about how she was
going to handle childcare and how unreasonable it was for her to ap-
ply for the job.70 Other disparate treatment cases involve the failure to
promote, which is very common in the FRD context. 71 Termination
cases also are common, 72 as are cases that involve sudden changes in
working conditions-for example, a transfer to a less desirable job, a
decrease in the quality or number of work assignments, or a sudden
negative turn in performance evaluations. 73 All of these issues have
been litigated successfully through Title VII disparate treatment
claims.
Defining the plaintiffs comparators becomes a strategic issue
when lawyers bring FRD disparate treatment cases under Title VII. For
plaintiffs, the proper comparison is not men to women, but mothers
to others, because if one looks around the workplace in many desira-
ble jobs, often the plaintiff is the only mother there. Trezza v. Hartford,
InC.7 4 is an early case that exemplifies this phenomenon: of the forty-
six managing attorneys'in Ms. Trezza's company, not one of them was
a woman with school-aged children. 75 The court compared mothers of
school-age children with fathers of school-age children. 76 What is
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132-1148 (2000).
69. SeeJOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA T. CALVERT, WoRKL1FE LAw's GUIDE TO CAREGIVER
DISCRIMINATION (Center for WorkLife Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law ed.) (forthcoming 2006).
70. Senuta v. City of Groton, No. 3:01-CV475, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10792, at *6 (D.
Conn. Mar. 5, 2002).
71. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003), affd, 383 F.3d
580 (7th Cir. 2004); Senuta, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10792, at *24; Moore v. Ala. State Univ.,
980 F. Supp. 426 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Carter v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1150,
1167-68 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
72. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 2001);
Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
73. See, e.g., Gallina v. Mintz No. 03-1883 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1710, at *7 (4th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2005); Sigmon, 901 F. Supp. at 672.
74. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998).
75. Id. at *7.
76. Id.
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more, as discussed earlier, the Back and Lust cases show that plaintiffs
can bring Title VII disparate treatment cases based on gender stereo-
typing evidence even when the plaintiff has no comparator. 77
FRD cases have also been litigated successfully as disparate impact
cases. For example, in Roberts v. United States Postmaster General,78 a
Texas court found that a female employee's claims that the em-
ployer's refusal to allow her to use sick leave to care for her child
raised an issue of disparate impact.79 An interesting example of a dis-
parate impact FRD is at issue in the major gender discrimination class
action lawsuit currently pending against Wal-Mart: Dukes v. Wal-Mart.80
One of the requirements for promotion to management at Wal-Mart
was that the employee be willing and able to move to different geo-
graphic locations. 81 There was no legitimate business justification for
this as Wal-Mart has stores everywhere. Further, research shows that
women are less able to uproot their families and move for theirjobs.82
This seemingly neutral job requirement had a disparate impact on
women. Wal-Mart used this unnecessary requirement-now aban-
doned-as part of its classification process, resulting in far fewer wo-
men than men being promoted.83
Other legal theories under Title VII include hostile work environ-
ment, harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation. The Walsh
case, in which the mother of the child with persistent ear infections
was harassed by her supervisor, was brought as a hostile work environ-
ment case.84 Not only did Ms. Walsh's supervisor subject her to far
more intense scrutiny than her co-workers and refer to her son as "the
sickling," but her supervisor also threw a phone book at her, telling
her to find a new pediatrician open after work hours.85 Further, when
Ms. Walsh fainted from stress, her supervisor told her, "you better not
77. See Back v. Hastings, 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d
580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
78. 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
79. Id. at 289.
80. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
81. Id. at 152.
82. See, e.g., William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender-
Role Beliefs, and Reluctance to Relocate for a Better Job, 97 Am. J. Soc. 1241 (1992).
83. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 160-61, available at http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/
walmartclass/classcert.pdf.
84. Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2003).
85. Id. at 1155.
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be pregnant again. ' 86 Ms. Walsh won a $625,000 judgment against her
employer. 87
Even more severe than the Walsh case is the case of Bergstrom-Ek v.
Best Oil Co.,88 in which Ms. Bergstrom's employer was found to have
constructively discharged her after her supervisor repeatedly tried to
convince the pregnant Bergstrom to have an abortion and threatened
to push her down the stairs.89 Not surprisingly, Ms. Bergstrom
prevailed. 90
An important case from the Seventh Circuit is Washington v. Illi-
nois Department of Revenue.91 Ms. Washington, who had complained of
race discrimination at work, brought a Title VII retaliation case
against her employer who, allegedly in retaliation for her race com-
plaint, took away her 7-to-3 pm work schedule and required her to
work 9-to-5. 92 In another remarkable opinion by a conservative judge,
Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit ruled that taking away Ms.
Washington's flexible work arrangement constituted an adverse em-
ployment action under the Title VII retaliation standard.93 Ms. Wash-
ington had a son with Down syndrome. 94 The court held that the
flexible schedule Ms. Washington had worked for over fifteen years
was crucial to her, such that having to work 9-to-5 constituted a "mate-
rially adverse" change. 95
Even more remarkable, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
v. White,96 the United States Supreme Court adopted the standard es-
poused in Washington when it defined what constitutes retaliation
under Title VII. The Court relied on Washington by ruling that
"[c]ontext matters" when determining whether an employer's action
constitutes retaliation. 97 For example, the Court wrote, "[a] schedule
change in an employee's work schedule may make little difference to
many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with
school age [sic] children."98 The Court adopted the broad, yet objec-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1157.
88. 153 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998).
89. Id. at 854-55.
90. Id. at 860.
91. 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 659.
93. Id. at 663.
94. Id. at 659.
95. Id. at 662.
96. 125 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
97. Id. at 2415.
98. Id.
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tive, standard articulated in Washington, defining retaliation as what "a
reasonable employee would have found ... materially adverse" under
the circumstances. 99
FRD cases also have been brought under ERISA' t°1-an impor-
tant and emerging theory for FRD litigation because of tax implica-
tions for employers. For example, several cases brought under ERISA
challenged an employer's refusal to give women pension credits for
time off while having or raising children. 10 1 FRD cases have been
brought under the ADA "association provision," under which it is ille-
gal to discriminate against a worker based on his or her association
with a person with a disability, such as having a disabled child or
spouse. 10 2 In one such case, an employer took over another company
and hired every single person from the former company except for a
mother with a disabled child. 0 3
Many FRD cases are brought under the FMLA, not only for denial
of leave and retaliation upon returning from leave, but also for inter-
ference with the right to take leave.10 4 Other cases have been brought
under the EPA, like the important case of Lovell v. BBAT Solutions,
LLC, 0 5 in which a jury awarded $900,000, later reduced, to a female
chemist who worked thirty hours per week for which she was paid at a
lower wage rate than men who performed the same job but worked
forty hours per week. 10 6
As shown by the wide array of theories in the over six-hundred
cases the Center has studied, many employees who have experienced
FRD are using current antidiscrimination laws successfully to sue their
employers.
99. Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132-1148, 1140 (2000).
101. See, e.g., Woods v. Qwest Info. Techs., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Neb. 2004).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (4) (2000); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, Questions and Answers About the Association Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/associationada.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2006).
103. Abdel-Khalek v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97 Civ. 4514, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2369,
at *4-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1999).
104. See, e.g., Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2003); Fisher v.
Rizzo Bros. Painting Contractors, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
105. 295 F. Supp. 2d 611 (E.D. Va. 2003), reconsideration denied, 299 F. Supp. 2d 612
(E.D. Va. 2004).
106. Lovell, 295 F. Supp. at 615-16.
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V. The Normative Impact of the Threat of FRD Litigation
What is the impact on employers of these lawsuits under these
different legal theories? As a subset of sociologists known as "new insti-
tutionalists" are studying, it is the threat of litigation, more than litiga-
tion itself, that produces social change.' 0 7 An example of this
occurred in 2002, after the Center published its first report on FRD,
which included only twenty to thirty cases. A management-side legal
service advised employers'0 8 to do all of the following: review person-
nel policies and survey employees to make sure that no family respon-
sibilities discrimination was occurring, "consider prorating at least
some benefits for part-time employees," "consider permitting flexible
schedules and/or telecommuting," consider setting up leave banks,
avoid questioning applicants and employees about their family situa-
tions or child-bearing plans, and not make assumptions or use stereo-
types. 109 Interestingly, this advice combines both what is absolutely
prohibited by the four corners of the law-treating men and women
differently-with actions that are far beyond where the case law was
then-for example, allowing part-time equity, telecommuting, and
flexible schedules.
To explain this phenomenon, consider what management-side at-
torneys do.110 Management-side lawyers see their work as a mix of
human resources advice and legal advice. As the new institutionalists
tell us, employers often go beyond the four corners of the law because
it decreases uncertainty and maximizes legitimacy.'11 For example,
107. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated
Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & Soc'v REv. 47, 60-61 (1992) (discussing how employ-
ers rely on the characterization of the legal environment by legal professionals to construct
the magnitude of the threat of litigation); see also Mark Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman,
Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 903, 937-38 (1996) (discussing how the legal system's adoption of structural
bias makes litigation hard to predict).
108. M. Lee Smith Publishers, LLC, HRHero.com Website Homepage, http://
www.HRHero.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2006).
109. M. Lee Smith Publishers, LLC, Washington D.C. Employment Law Letter: A Glass
Ceiling for Parents?, http://www.HRHero.com/pregnancy/parents-print.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2006) (citing the initial report, Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Families that
Work: The Program on Gender, Work & Family, Am. Univ., Wash. Coll. of Law, Aug.
2002).
110. The Center consciously works with both plaintiff-side and management-side
attorneys.
111. See, e.g., WALTER W. POWELL & PAULJ. DIMAGGIO, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Univ. of Chi. Press 1991); Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Civil
Rights Law at Work: Sex Discrimination and the Rise of Maternity Leave Policies, 105 AM. J. Soc.
455 (1999);John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. Soc. 340 (1977).
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one Equal Employment Opportunity officer of a large cultural institu-
tion told us that when an employee told the officer that after having
children, she was experiencing maternal-wall problems, the officer
simply took a copy of the Center's 2003 maternal-wall law review arti-
cle" 12 to the head of human resources, and the woman's situation
changed virtually overnight. More recently, Business Insurance, a publi-
cation for executives and insurers, has reported on the Center's re-
search on FRD litigation, a sign that employers are beginning to
understand FRD as a risk-management issue." 13
This highlights another lesson from new institutionalism: the im-
portant role played by intermediaries, such as human resources pro-
fessionals, corporate counsel, and the press.1 4 In many ways, it is not
lawyers who make changes on the ground, it is human resources man-
agers. Corporate counsel also have the potential to play a large role in
this change. After all, why do many people leave law firms to go in-
house? It is because of work/family conflicts-they want or need
shorter hours and more flexibility to spend more time with their
families. 115
VI. Conclusions
Family responsibilities discrimination is an important, growing
trend that employers, employees, attorneys, judges, and in-
termediaries (including human resources personnel and corporate
counsel) should understand. In a context in which the total number
of federal employment discrimination lawsuits is decreasing,11 6 the
112. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffor Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
113. Gloria Gonzalez, Family Care Bias Suits Rise as Workers Assert Rights, Bus. INS., June
19, 2006, at 14.
114. See, e.g., Frances J. Milliken, Luis L. Martins & Hal Morgan, Explaining Organiza-
tional Responsiveness to Work-Family Issues: The Role of Human Resource Executives as Issue Inter-
preters, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 580 (1998); Susan P. Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001).
115. See, e.g., Corporate Counsel, 2003 Quality of Life Survey: They Didn't Do It for the Stock
Options (Dec. 2003) (eighty-three percent of respondents said a desire for a healthy bal-
ance between work and personal life was an important factor in deciding to work in-
house); CATALYST, WOMEN IN LAW: MAKING THE CASE 57 (2001) (sixty-one percent of in-
house women and forty-seven percent of in-house men cite work/life balance as a reason
for choosing their current employer).
116. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S.
District Courts. Civil Cases Filed by Nature of Suit 2, Table 4.4, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table4O4.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2006) (reporting
a steady decline in the number of federal civil rights employment cases filed from 21,157 in
FY2001 to 16,930 in FY2005).
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number of FRD cases is growing. Employees often identify balancing
work and family as their primary employment problem," 17 and articles
about motherhood and work seem to appear in newspapers on a daily
basis. The concepts of the maternal-wall and family responsibilities
discrimination should be included in employment law casebooks and
taught in employment law courses around the country.
In addition, recognizing patterns of gender stereotyping no
longer requires expert testimony and litigating a case based on stereo-
types need not be as expensive as it once was. While it is important to
define comparators properly in Title VII cases-that is, as mothers (or
fathers) and others rather than as women and men-FRD cases can
be litigated without comparators by using stereotyping evidence.
While motherhood is one of the key triggers for gender discrimi-
nation, maternal-wall bias also affects fathers by policing them into
traditional, stereotypical gender roles. For example, when men are pe-
nalized for exercising their rights to take leave, they stop taking leave
in order to avoid this bias at work-which forces women to take more
leave and, in a vicious cycle, reinforces outdated gender stereotypes.
That companies are making practical changes in response to the
threat of FRD litigation provides insight into the complex process by
which legal change fuels institutional and normative changes.
Through the advice of intermediaries, such as human resources per-
sonnel and corporate counsel, work/life balance is no longer just a
benefits issue; it is a risk-management issue as well. Wise employers
will change their practices and policies in order to avoid committing
FRD-and the best defense is a family-friendly workplace.
Lastly, the vast number of published cases-not to mention arbi-
trated or settled cases-debunk the old essentialism argument that
gender discrimination litigation only helps rich, professional wo-
men. 118 Grocery clerks, policewomen, customer service representa-
tives, executives, and women of every class and race hit the maternal
wall.1 19 FRD happens to workers in all areas of the economy. In-
117. CATALYST, WOMEN IN THE LAW: MAKING THE CASE 40 (2001) ("Over 70% of both
men and women-partners and associates-report they have difficulty balancing the de-
mands of work with the demands of their personal life.").
118. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory in CRITI-
CAL RACE FEMINISM II (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
119. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st
Cir. 2000) (high-level executive was terminated shortly after her employer learned she
planned to have more children); Troy v. Bay State Computer Group, Inc., 141 F.3d 378,
380 (1st Cir. 1998) (employer suggested that pregnant customer service representative em-
ployee quit due to an illness unrelated to her pregnancy); Tomaselli v. Upper Pottsgrove
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creased understanding of stereotyping evidence and the institutional
change that can result from the threat of FRD litigation has the power
to reach all areas of the economy as well.
Twp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25754 at *2-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2004) (female police officer
was harassed while pregnant and after her child was born, received unwarranted discipline,
was subjected to derogatory remarks, and was required to work twelve-hour shifts despite
earlier assurances that she could work eight-hour shifts); Carter v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc.,
470 F. Supp. 1150, 1167-68 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (employer refused to promote female gro-
cery clerks to managerial position on the grounds that their child-care responsibilities
would prevent them from working long hours).
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